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In re Lisa R. 13 Cal.3d 336, 532 P.2d 123,
119, Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975)
In Stanley v. Illinois,1 the United States Supreme Court held
that an unwed father who claims that he is fit to care for his children and desires to do so is entitled to a hearing on the issue of
his fitness. This decision has been implemented recently by the
California Supreme Court in In re Lisa.2 In that case the court
held that a natural father may present evidence of his paternity
notwithstanding a statutory presumption,3 which on its face, preduring an
cluded him from so doing because the child was born
4
existing marriage to which the father was not a party.
In Stanley, the unwed parents lived together for eighteen years
during which time they had three children. Upon the death of the
mother, the illegitimate children, pursuant to the Illinois statutory
scheme, were declared wards of the state, removed from their
father's custody and placed in guardianship without proof of neglect and without a hearing as to the fitness of the father, who, under
the statutory procedure, was presumed to be unfit to raise his
children.
The United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles an unwed father to
a hearing before his children can be taken from him; it further
concluded that the state cannot, consistently with due process, presume that unmarried parents are unfit and that the denial to
unwed fathers of a hearing on fitness accorded to all other parents
whose custody is challenged is a denial of the equal protection. 5
The Court, however, went beyond the facts of the case and held
that the state was required to afford a hearing to all unwed fathers
1. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) [hereinafter Stanley].

2. 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
3. CAL. EvID. CODE § 661 (West 1966). A child of a woman who is or
has been married, born during the marriage or within 300 days after the
dissolution thereof, is presumed to be a legitimate child of that marriage.
This presumption may be disputed only by the people of the State of Cal-

ifornia in a criminal proceeding under Section 270 of the Penal Code or
by the husband or wife, or the descendant of one or both of them. In
a civil action, this presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof.
4. 13 Cal. 3d at 647-51, 532 P.2d at 130-33, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 482-85.
5. 405 U.S. at 656-58.
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who claim that they are fit to care for their children when the
mother cannot, or will not, provide that care and who desire to
care for their children. 6
It was against the backdrop of the Stanley case that the
California Supreme Court rendered its decision in In re Lisa R.
Lisa R. was born in August 1966. Her mother was found in a drunken condition in her gas-filled home with Lisa and another minor.
She had previously pleaded guilty to a child neglect charge and
was on probation. The county probation office filed a petition
to make Lisa a dependent child of the juvenile court. The report
disclosed that Lisa's mother had revealed that Lisa was conceived
during a casual relationship with appellant Victor R. during the
time she and her husband were separated. 7 On July 3, 1969, the
petition was sustained and Lisa was adjudged a dependent child
of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 600,
subdivision (a).8
Lisa was placed in the custody of foster parents. After short
stays at two foster homes, Lisa was placed in another foster home,
where she still resided at the time of the appeal.9
In June 1970, the first annual dependency review resulted in an
order that Lisa's dependency status be continued. The probation
officer's report disclosed that Lisa's mother had become addicted
to heroin, and that the whereabouts of Victor R., identified as Lisa's
biological father, remained unknown. 10 The 1971 annual review
was accompanied by a report that the husband of Lisa's mother
6. Id. at 657 n. 9; see State ex rel. v. Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Wis. &
Upper Mich., 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), vacated sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972); Rich, Plight of the
Putative Father in California Custody Proceedings: A Problem of Equal
Protection, 6 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1973); 13 Cal.3d at 648, 532 P.2d at
130, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
7. 13 Cal. 3d at 630, 532 P.2d at 125, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 477; In re Lisa
R., 41 Cal.App. 3d 89, 92-93, 115 Cal. Rptr. 859, 861 (1974).
8. Section 600 provides in pertinent part: Any person under the age
of 18 years who comes within any of the following descriptions is within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge such person to
be a dependent child of the court. (a) Who is in need of proper and
effective parental care or control and has no parent or guardian, or has
no parent or guardian, or has no parent or guardian willing to exercise or
capable of exercising such care or control.
9. 13 Cal.3d at 640, 532 P.2d at 125, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 477.

10. Id.

had died of a drug overdose. The report again identified Victor
R. as Lisa's natural father. The child's dependency status was continued at this time and again at the following review in June
1972.11

The fourth annual review of Lisa's status was held in July of
1973. At the hearing, Victor R. appeared with counsel whom he
had employed to commence proceedings to have Lisa placed in his
custody. 12 He offered to prove certain facts in order to establish
his standing before the court. Appellant offered to prove that he
commenced living with Lisa's mother in September 1965 while she
was separated from her husband. She soon became pregnant. Lisa
was born on August 1, 1966, as a result of this pregnancy. His
surname was used on the birth certificate, and he acknowledged
Lisa as his child. He lived with Lisa's mother until the child was
four or five months old. Lisa's mother turned to her husband and,
contrary to appellant's wishes, would not turn Lisa over to him.
He was finally able to locate Lisa in 1970 through county welfare
agencies. Appellant and his wife visited her until advised by welfare officials that such visits must be discontinued. In 1973, after
a petition brought under Civil Code Section 232 to establish that
Lisa had been abandoned by her parents was denied, appellant
made arrangements to again visit Lisa. Proof was further offered
that appellant was healthy, had a steady job, had a good relationship with his four sons, and that his immediate plans were to establish a relationship with Lisa and make a home for her.'8
At the hearing, the court first entertained appellant's offer of
proof; it then ruled that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to
determine paternity, that appellant had no standing and that appellant be excluded from the court.14
The effect of the juvenile court ruling was that Lisa's only living
parent was denied the right to see her and to participate in proceedings concerning her welfare and custody. Health had deprived Lisa
of her mother and stepfather. As a result of the denial of a petition
in 1973 to have Lisa declared an abandoned child under Civil Code
Section 232, Lisa could not be freed for adoption. She would have
to remain in foster care until she was eighteen. In effect, Lisa had
been made an orphan, even though she had a living parent who
wanted ,to care for her.15
11. Id. at 641, 532 P.2d 126, 119 Cal. Rptr. 478.
12. Id.

13. Id. at 642, 532 P.2d at 127, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 478 n.4.
14. Id. at 642, 532 P.2d at 127, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
15. Brief for Appellant at 4 and 17, In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532
P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
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The Supreme Court of California reversed the court below. The
threshold question of whether the juvenile court is vested with
jurisdiction to determine the paternity of a minor dependent was
answered in the affirmative.' 6 Although the juvenile court is not
specifically vested with such jurisdiction, it does have the authority
to make such determinations incidentally necessary to its functions. 17 For example, the determination that a child should be
a dependent ward because she has no parent cannot be made with8
out a contemporaneous determination of parentage.'
After disposition of the jurisdictional question, the critical
question remaining before the court was whether appellant, Victor
R. could offer proof that he was Lisa's natural father, notwithstanding a statutory presumption which, on its face, precluded him from
so doing.' 9 Evidence Code Section 661 provides that the child of
a married woman is presumed to be the legitimate child of that
marriage, and that the presumption can only be rebutted by the
married woman, her husband, the descendents of one or both of.
them or the State of California in an action under Section 270 of
20
the Penal Code.
In holding that the presumption violated due process, the court
followed the approach in Stanley by balancing the interests of the
father in his child against the interest of the State in precluding
the father from proving his paternity. 21 The court was careful
to point out that the interest of the appellant, as in Stanley, arose
from more than the mere biological fact of parenthood. 2 2 Appellant resided with Lisa's mother both before and after her birth,
contributed to Lisa's support, and his name appeared on her birth
certificate. He was deprived of Lisa's custody against his wishes,
16. Id. at 644, 532 P.2d at 128, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
17. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 701 (West 1972).

18. 13 Cal.3d at 643, 532 P.2d at 127-28, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 479-80.
19. Id. at 647, 532 P.2d at 130, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
20. CAL. EviD. CODE § 661 (West 1966); Section 270 of the Penal Code
provides:
"If a father of either a legitimate or an illegitimate minor
child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his
child, he is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding
one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment."

21. 13 Cal.3d at 649-51, 523 P.2d at 132-33, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 484-85.
22. Id. at 649, 532 P.2d at 131, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 483.

and consistently sought to assert his rights as her father. Appellant's wife was aware that he lived with Lisa's mother and gave
2 3
her permission and encouragement for appellant to acknowledge
Lisa as his child. Furthermore, appellant had no alternative
24
remedy by which to protect his interest as Lisa's father.
On the other hand, the court noted the interest of the state in
the welfare of the child was not served by statutory presumption,
and in fact, might be defeated if the natural father was a fit parent.
The interest of the state in relieving the child of the strain of illegitimacy is not served because a natural father seeking to establish
paternity would undoubtedly intend to legitimize the child. The
interest in the preservation of the family unit is likewise not served
when the family unit has been dissolved by the health of the
mother and the presumed father. 25 With respect to the state's
interest in administrative convenience and judicial economy based
on the assumption that most unwed fathers are unfit parents, the
court looked to Stanley in rejecting the proposition:
A possible legitimate interest which the state might assert in support of the conclusiveness of the presumption is speed and efficiency of judicial inquiry in circumstances where such inquiry
might seldom be productive. In Stanley it was stated that it may
be argued that unwed fathers are seldom fit parents. It was nevertheless concluded that due process precluded the conclusiveness of
the presumption of unfitness. 'The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state
interest worthy of cognizance ....
But the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly
say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause
in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values
of a vulnerable citizenry from overbearing concern for efficiency
and efficacy ....
The state insists on presuming rather than
proving Stanley's unfitness solely because it is more convenient to
presume than prove. Under the Due Process Clause that advantage
is insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing when the issue
'26
at stake is the dismemberment of his family ....

The order of the court below was reversed to allow the appellant
to present evidence of his paternity. However, the status of the
child was not affected and she remained subject to the jurisdiction
23. CAL. Civ. CODE § 230 (West 1954). The father of an illegitimate
child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such, with
the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his family, and otherwise
treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such; and
such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time
of its birth. The foregoing provisions of this Chapter do not apply to such
an adoption.
24. 13 Cal.3d at 649, 532 P.2d at 131-33, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 483-84.
25. Id. at 650, 532 P.2d at 132, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
26. Id. at 650-51, 532 P.2d 133-34, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 484-85 quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-58.
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of the juvenile court. If appellant can establish paternity, the
court must determine that he is a fit parent before he may be
27
awarded custody.
The court declined the invitation of amicus curiae to issue a
comprehensive interpretation of Stanley28 and limited its decision
to the holding that the presumption which strictly precludes a
natural father from offering proof of his paternity under the facts
of this case is a violation of due process.2 9 The decision does,
however, indicate the posture which the California Supreme Court
has taken with respect to Stanley. The court noted that due
process does not require that the unmarried father be afforded an
opportunity to prove his parentage in all cases. Rather, the reasonableness of the statutory limitation on the right to offer proof of
parentage depends upon the circumstances of each particular case.s0
Therefore, the court must make a preliminary determination, as by
offer of proof, that due process would be offended if the particular
31
claimant were denied the opportunity to prove his paternity.
This requirement suggests that the California Supreme Court has
interpreted Stanley to mean that the interest of a father in his
child is not cognizable under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, unless there is a social as well as a biological relationship between father and child. Indeed, the court points out
that "[T] he private interest which appellant seeks to preserve in the
instant case as in Stanley arose from more than the mere biological fact that he is Lisa's natural father. ' '3 2 The court in Stanley
likewise referred to the unwed father's interest as "[T] hat of a man
in the children he has sired and raised.... ,,33 Such a restrictive
34
reading of Stanley poses practical limitations.
Though the court indicated that the existence or non-existence
of the right to a hearing under due process will require a factual
27. 13 Cal.3d at 651, 532 P.2d at 133, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485.

28. Brief for Children's Home Society of California as amicus curiae at

23, & In re Lisa R., 13 Cal.3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).

29. 13 Cal.3d at 648 n.14, 532 P.2d at 131 n.14, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 483
n.14.
30. Id. at 651, 532 P.2d at 133, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485.

31. Id.
32. Id. at 649, 532 P.2d at 131, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
33. 405 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added).

34. Comment, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 1581, 1606 (1972); Note, 59 VA. L. REV.
517, 522 (1973).

determination in each case, there is no objective standard to determine the extent of the social relationship between father and child
necessary to require constitutional protection. The courts will be
presented with difficult problems of interpretation which may lead
to arbitrary standards.85 A standard which does not recognize the
biological relationship alone as constitutionally protected does not
take into account the interest of a father in the future relationship
with his child. In many cases, the failure of the unwed father to
establish a relationship with his child may be the result of circumstances beyond his control. Since the mother of an illegitimate
child has the right to custody,8 6 she has the power to frustrate
the establishment of any social realtionship between father and
child. Since the natural father is not entitled to notice of adoption,37 she may put the child beyond his reach for all time. Even
if the court holds that the father is entitled to notice under Stanley,
the mother may frustrate its effectiveness by her failure to identify
the father.
Although the decision in In re Lisa R. deals solely with a
procedural question, that is, whether the unwed father under the
circumstances of this case is entitled to 'a hearing to prove his
parentage, the substantive effects of this decision are substantial.
If the appellant were to be denied a hearing he would lose the
rights attendant to the status which he sought to assert. The status
of a parent includes the right to the companionship, care, management and custody of the child if the parent is fit, as well as the
right to inherit from the child. It is important to note that in
balancing the interests which the unwed father here sought to protect against the interest of the state in denying a hearing, the court
relied 88 on Nebbia v. New York.80 The United States Supreme
Court in Nebbia considered the constitutionality of an economic
regulation. When regulating an economic interest, due process only
requires that the law have a reasonable relationship to effectuate
a purpose within the legitimate police power of the state without
being arbitrary or capricious. 40 However, the Supreme Court
pointed out in Stanley that "[i] t is plain that the interest of a
parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his
or her children come [s] to this Court with a momentum for respect
35. Note, 59 VA. L. REv. 517, 522.
36.

37.
(1962).
38.
39.
40.

CAL.

CIV.

CODE

§ 200 (West 1954).

Adoption of Laws, 201 Cal.App. 2d 494, 500, 20 Cal. Rptr. 64, 68
13 Cal.3d at 651, 532 P.2d at 133, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) [hereinafter Nebbia].
Id. at 537.
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lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from
shifting economic arrangements."'41 Stanley was premised, as the
California Court noted in its opinion, on the rights to conceive and
4
raise one's children,4 2 rights that have been deemed "essential", 3
"basic civil rights of men", 44 and "rights far more precious than
property rights".45
Rather than recognizing the fundamental
nature of these rights, the court in In re Lisa R. merely held the
presumption in this case to be "unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and a denial of due process". 40 The court has thus left open
for future adjudication the question of whether or not the impairment of the interests of an unwed father in his children will
require a showing of compelling necessity by the state rather than
the mere showing of a reasonable relation to a legitimate state
purpose necessary to uphold an economic regulation.

ELLIOT SHELTON

41. 405 U.S. at 651, quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949)
(concurring opinion).
42. 13 Cal.3d at 648, 532 P.2d at 131-32, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 482-83.
43. 405 U.S. 651, quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
44. 405 U.S. at 651, quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942).
45. 405 U.S. at 651, quoting May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
46. 13 Cal. 3d at 651, 532 P.2d at 133, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485.

